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Abstract
In a framework with an upstream monopoly and a downstream
duopoly, we analyze the impact of convex costs on the downstream
level. In constrast to the case of constant marginal costs, vertical in-
tegration does not imply complete market foreclosure. While the non-
integrated downstream ¯rm receives a strictly positive amount of the
intermediate good, the downstream allocation is ine±cient. However,
a parametrized example indicates that competition at the downstream
level may increase aggregate welfare.
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Recently, there have been several theoretical papers arguing that vertical in-
tegration may have severe anti-competitive e®ects. These papers, sometimes
referred to as new foreclosure theories, include Salinger (1988), Hart and
Tirole (1990), and Ordover et al. (1990). In rigorous game-theoretic mod-
els, the authors reestablish the more hostile view of vertical integration the
\naive" foreclosure theories of the 1950s and 1960s had suggested (see Rey
and Tirole, 1997).1 They thereby challenge the more benign view of vertical
restraints which was adopted since the 1980s following the contributions of
the Chicago School (see, e.g., Bork, 1978).2
Particularly in°uential has been the paper of Hart and Tirole (1990).3
The core of their analysis4 is a commitment problem. Suppose there is an
upstream monopolist and two downstream ¯rms. Without vertical integra-
tion, the monopolist cannot fully exercise its monopoly power because, once
terms are ¯xed with one downstream ¯rm, the contract with the other down-
stream ¯rm will be arranged at the disadvantage of the ¯rst ¯rm. Since
downstream ¯rms will anticipate this kind of opportunistic behavior, the
upstream monopolist cannot fully exploit its monopoly position. As a con-
sequence, competition at the downstream level increases social welfare. By
contrast, if the upstream monopoly is vertically integrated with one of the
downstream ¯rms, it can foreclose the other ¯rm by selling the intermediate
1Antitrust policy was similarly disapproving of vertical mergers. Leading cases are U.S.
v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. 334 U.S. 495, Brown Shoe & Co. v. U.S. 370 U.S. 294
(1962), and Ford Motor Co. v. U.S. 405 U.S. 562 (1972).
2It seems remarkable that vertical mergers are not covered in the 1992 revision of the
U.S. Departments of Justice's Merger Guidelines at all.
3For closely related papers, see O'Brian and Scha®er (1992), McAfee and Schwartz
(1994) and Rey and Tirole (1997). Snyder (1995) contains a survey of empirical tests of
the models, and Martin, Normann and Snyder (2001) provide experimental evidence.
4We refer to Hart and Tirole's (1990) ex post monopolization variant.
1good exclusively to its own downstream ¯rm. Assuming constant marginal
costs at the downstream level, Hart and Tirole (1990) show that the ver-
tically integrated ¯rm completely forecloses the nonintegrated ¯rm and re-
stricts output at the monopoly level. Therefore, vertical integration solves
the commitment problem. Competition at the downstream level due to the
nonintegrated ¯rm does not imply any positive welfare e®ects.
It is the purpose of this paper to show that these results crucially de-
pend on the assumption of constant marginal costs at the downstream level.
Assuming convex marginal costs, we show that vertical integration is not
su±cient to overcome the commitment problem and that competition at
the downstream level can increase social welfare. With convex marginal
costs, complete foreclosure of the nonintegrated downstream ¯rm implies an
ine±cient allocation of the total output. Distributing the quantity among
both downstream ¯rms increases e±ciency and hence the monopolist's pro¯t.
However, any contract with the nonintegrated downstream ¯rm is still sub-
ject to the commitment problem. Once a contract is ¯xed, the integrated
monopolist will set the quantity supplied to its own downstream ¯rm at the
disadvantage of the nonintegrated downstream ¯rm. Hence, vertical integra-
tion does not fully solve the commitment problem with convex downstream
costs. Competition at the downstream level leads to an increase in the quan-
tity supplied and can increase social welfare as compared to the situation
where the upstream monopolist can credibly commit to o®er the monopoly
output.
Our results con¯rm the concerns of Rey and Tirole (1997, p.21) and Bork
(1978, p.228) about the complete foreclosure result in the literature. Rey
and Tirole (1997, p.21) note that the complete exclusion of the noninte-
2grated ¯rm is a \drastic consequence" and that supply of the downstream
competitor is \a sometimes realistic scenario." Bork (1978, p.228) pointed
out the ine±ciency of complete foreclosure: \If the marginal costs of retailing
are rising|as they certainly are, unless the retailer is a natural monopolist|
the arti¯cial low price [o®ered to the integrated retailer] would result in an
increased output at higher costs."
At a more general level, our results show that vertical integration may
not be a su±cient instrument for earning monopoly pro¯ts. In our model,
there is a strict loss of pro¯t from downstream competition even with vertical
integration. This is related to the results of Alexander and Rei®en (1995)
who show that exclusive territories and resale price maintenance may in fact
not have the commitment power the theoretical literature asserts. Similarly,
Rei®en (1992) argues that a vertical merger per se is not su±cient in the
model of Ordover et al. (1990). All this suggest that vertical integration
does not imply monopolization without quali¯cation.
In section 2 we introduce our model and specify the ¯rms' pro¯t functions
in three di®erent scenarios. We ¯rst consider nonintegration where an up-
stream monopolist faces two independent downstream ¯rms. In the second
scenario, the upstream monopolist is integrated with one of the two down-
stream ¯rms. In the third scenario, the upstream ¯rm can credibly commit
to o®er any level of output (e.g. through observable or complete contracts).
In section 3, we compare equilibrium outputs for the three scenarios and
analyze the impact on pro¯ts, consumers' surplus and welfare. We conclude
in section 4.
32 The Model
Consider a market with one upstream ¯rm, U; and two downstream ¯rms,
Di, i = 1;2; and suppose that downstream ¯rms compete in quantities. The
qi are ¯rms' individual outputs, and Q = q1 + q2 is industry output. We
make the following assumptions:
A1. The inverse demand function, p(Q); is weakly concave with p0(Q) < 0
and p00(Q) · 0.




A3. The downstream ¯rms have symmetric convex production costs c(q) =
c1(q) = c2(q), with c(0) = 0, c0(q) > 0 and c00(q) > 0.
The demand and cost functions are public knowledge. As in Hart and
Tirole (1990), we assume that U o®ers take-it-or-leave-it contracts to the
downstream ¯rms. The contracts have the form (qi;Ti), where qi is a certain
quantity o®ered for a ¯xed tari® Ti. We will analyze the following three sce-
narios. First, there is the nonintegrated case (n). Second, there is integration
(i) between ¯rm U and ¯rm D1. In the third scenario, U can commit (c).
Nonintegration. In this scenario, the upstream ¯rm is not integrated
with either of the downstream ¯rms. Contracts are not observable, that is,
(qi;Ti) is secretly o®ered to Di.5 Therefore, this is a game of incomplete
information. Following Hart and Tirole, we assume that a downstream ¯rm
believes that its rival is being o®ered the equilibrium contract independently
of its own contract. After observing an out-of-equilibrium o®er, a ¯rm does
5If contracts were obserable (and not renegotiable), the upstream ¯rm would get
monopoly pro¯ts even without any further vertical restraint. See the commitment sce-
nario below.
4not revise its beliefs about the o®er made to its rival (which captures the idea
of the possibility of small decision errors). McAfee and Schwartz (1994) call
such beliefs passive beliefs. Passive beliefs imply that U considers the two
downstream markets separately (\market-by-market conjecture", Rey and
Tirole, 1997).6
With secret contracts and passive beliefs, downstream ¯rm i accepts any
contract (qi;Ti) with Ti · ¼i(qi; ~ qj), where ~ qj with j = 1;2;i 6= j denotes the
candidate equilibrium quantity of Dj and ¼i(qi; ~ qj) = p(qi + ~ qj)qi ¡ ci(qi) is
downstream ¯rm i's gross pro¯t. It follows that U chooses Ti = ¼i(qi; ~ qj) and
qi such that
qi = argmax
q [¼i(q; e qj) ¡ cU(q + e qj)]: (1)
Since (1) must hold for both downstream ¯rms, the quantities o®ered in a
perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium must satisfy the mutual best response
property, i.e., they must constitute a Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Our above







[pqi ¡ ci ¡ cU] = p




U = 0 (2)
are downward sloping with q¤0
i 2 (¡1;0): Therefore, a unique Cournot-Nash
equilibrium quantity solving qn = q¤
i(qn) exists. The unique perfect Bayesian
equilibrium is given by U o®ering (qn;Tn) to both downstream ¯rms with
Tn := ¼i(qn;qn). Let Qn := 2qn denote industry output.
Integration. We assume that the integrated ¯rm U-D1 cannot credibly
commit to produce a certain quantity q1 prior to o®ering any contract (q2;T2)
to D2. To determine the optimal contract we consider two cases. First, D2
6See also O'Brian and Scha®er (1992). Alternative beliefs lead to other equilibria. For
example, McAfee and Schwartz (1994) show that symmetric beliefs lead to the monopoly
outcome without vertical restraints.
7To simplify the notation, we often omit arguments in the following.
5accepts the contract and supplies q2. Second, D2 accepts the contract but
supplies a quantity b q2 smaller than q2. In the ¯rst case, the optimal quantity
q¤





[¼1(q1;q2) ¡ cU(q1 + q2)]: (3)
Anticipating q¤









holds. Suppose (5) holds. With T2 = ¼2(q2;q¤
1(q2)) the reduced pro¯t func-
tion ¼i(q2) of ¯rm U-D1 can be written as
¼
i(q2) = p(q2 + q
¤
1) ¡ c1 ¡ c2 ¡ cU: (6)
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U · 0 and ¼
i0 ¢ q2 = 0: (7)
Since q¤0
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U > 0: (8)




2))), D2 supplies qi
2 and industry out-




Turning to the second case, assume that U-D1 o®ers a contract (q2;T2)
such that D2 accepts the contract but supplies a quantity b q2 < q2. Then, the
supplied quantities are characterized by
b q2(q2) = argmax
e q2
¼2(e q2; b q1(e q2;q2))
with b q2 < q2 and b q1(e q2;q2) = argmax
q1
[¼1(q1; e q2) ¡cU(q1 + q2)]:
6Comparing the necessary conditions for b q2(q2) and b q1(e q2;q2) shows that D2
would supply b q1 if U-D1 had o®ered a (accepted) contract with b q1 instead
of q2. Furthermore, using (3) reveals q¤
1(b q1) < b q2. Hence, U-D1 could in-
crease its pro¯t by o®ering (b q1;¼2(b q1;q¤
1(b q1))) instead of (q2;T2) with T2 ·
¼2(b q2;b q1(b q1;q2)). Therefore, any contract with q2 > b q2(q2) can not be optimal





Commitment. In this scenario, we assume that U can credibly commit
to any output level. A simple commitment device are observable contracts
(McAfee and Schwartz, 1994).8 Observability implies that each downstream
¯rm knows the quantity o®ered to the other ¯rm when deciding on accepting
its own contract. Hence, in a subgame perfect equilibrium, ¯rm i will accept
any o®er (qi;Ti) with Ti · ¼i(qi;qj). U will choose Ti = ¼i(qi;qj) and the
quantities such that total industry pro¯ts
¼
c = p(q1 + q2) ¡ c1 ¡ c2 ¡ cU: (9)
are maximized. Let denote qc the quantity which solves
@¼c
@qi








U = 0: (10)
Convexity and symmetry of the cost functions imply that U o®ers qc to both
downstream ¯rms D1 and D2: Total industry output is given by Qc := 2qc >
Qn.
3 The Results
We start by analyzing the impact of vertical integration on output.
8Other commitment devices are complete contracts (in which the price of the interme-
diate good can be made contingent upon the ¯nal good price) or integration with both
downstream ¯rms.
7Proposition 1 With vertical integration, the nonintegrated downstream ¯rm
receives qi
2 > 0 and the integrated downstream ¯rm receives q¤
1(qi
2) > qn:
Industry output Qi is greater than in the commitment scenario but smaller
than in the nonintegration case, i.e., Qi 2 (Qc;Qn).
Proof. We ¯rst show that qi












U < 0 (11)
from (10) and c0
1(2qc) > c0
1(qc): Therefore some q2 2 (0;qc) exists for which
q2 + q¤
1(q2) = 2qc: Call this quantity qk
2; i.e., qk
2 := fq2jq2 + q¤
1(q2) = 2qcg.
Again using (10), we get
@¼i
@q2






















2 > 0; (12)
where the last inequality follows from p0qk
2q¤0
1 > 0 and qk
2 < qc: Hence, we get
Qi > Qc and qi
2 > 0: Using (2), we obtain
@¼i
@q2















1 ) < 0 (13)
which yields q¤
1(qi
2) > qn and so Qi < Qn.2
With integration and convex downstream costs, the nonintegrated down-
stream ¯rm receives a strictly positive quantity. Note that constant marginal
costs, i.e., c00
1 = c00
2 = 0, and (10) would yield qi
2 = 0 and q¤
1 = 2qc. Convex
downstream costs imply that q2 = 0 results in a highly ine±cient allocation
which forces U-D1 to choose qi
2 > 0. The monopolist's commitment prob-
lem then implies that total industry output is increased compared to the
commitment case.
Concerning consumers' surplus (CS) and the upstream ¯rm's pro¯ts,
Proposition 1 leads to the following
8Corollary For consumers' surplus, CSn > CSi > CSc holds, while for U's
pro¯t ¼c > ¼i > ¼n holds.
Proof. CSn > CSi > CSc follows simply from Qn > Qi > Qc. In the
commitment scenario, industry pro¯ts are maximized. Since Qi > Qc we
obtain ¼c > ¼i. Because ¼n is feasible with integration, but as seen in the
proof of Proposition 1, @¼i=@q2 < 0 at q2 = qn
2, it follows that ¼i > ¼n. 2
Finally, we consider the implication on welfare. When comparing W i
and W c; we have Qi > Qc (suggesting an increase in welfare), but there is
an e±ciency loss in production with integration. In that case the general
implications for welfare are ambiguous and, therefore, we can only analyze a
parametrized model.
Proposition 2 For total welfare, W n > W i and W n > W c holds. For linear
demand and linear-quadratic costs, we get W i > W c.
Proof. W n > W c follows from Qn > Qc and p(2qn) > c0(qn) + c0
U(2qn):
Similarly, Wn > W i follows from Qn > Qi where, in addition, production of
Qi is ine±cient.
To prove W i > W c for linear demand and linear-quadratic costs, assume
that p(Q) = 1 ¡ Q and that cU(Q) = 0:5®Q2 and c(q) = 0:5¯q2 with ®;¯ >
0:9 It is straightforward to derive qc = 1=(4 + 2® + ¯), ¼c = 1=(4 + 2® + ¯),
and CSc = 2=(4 + 2® + ¯)2. Further, q¤
1(q2) = (1 ¡ q2(1 + ®))=(2 + ® + ¯).





1 + ¯(4 + 2® + ¯)
; (14)
9Using p(Q) = a ¡ bQ; cU(Q) = ®1Q + 0:5®2Q2 and c(q) = ¯1q + 0:5¯2q2 with all
parameters being positive would not change our results. The additional parameters a;b;®1






1 + ¯(3 + ® + ¯)
(2 + ® + ¯)(1 + ¯(4 + 2® + ¯))
: (15)
Note that for ® = ¯ = 0; the constant marginal (zero) cost equilibrium
results: qi
2 = 0 and q¤
1(0) = 0:5. We obtain
¼
i =
1 + 2¯(2 + ® + ¯)




(1 + ¯(5 + 2® + 2¯)2
2(2 + ® + ¯)2(1 + ¯(4 + 2® + ¯))2 (17)






c) > 0 8 ®;¯ > 0 and lim
¯!0
¢W = 0 (18)
holds.2
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze a model of vertical integration allowing for con-
vex cost functions at the downstream level. As a result, the nonintegrated
downstream ¯rm sells a strictly positive quantity. Since the integrated down-
stream ¯rm receives a larger quantity, the downstream allocation is ine±-
cient. However, compared to the scenario in which the upstream ¯rm can
credibly commit, aggregate output increases. For linear demand and linear-
quadratic costs, this increase in output is su±cient to more than compensate
the e±ciency loss in production. In such cases, welfare increases.
Our results suggest that upstream monopolists, choosing among various
vertical contractual arrangements, should actually look for devices which en-
able to fully commit themselves (e.g. publicly observable contracts) rather
than to integrate downwards. In our model, upstream monopolists are only
10indi®erent between integration and such a commitment device when the
downstream industry exhibits constant marginal costs. On a policy level,
however, this does by no means imply that vertical integration is harmless.
Though the nonintegrated downstream ¯rmis not completely foreclosed when
cost functions are convex, there is market foreclosure in the sense of reduced
output, compared to the vertically unrestricted market. In addition, there
are ine±ciencies in the downstream allocation with integration, so, generally,
welfare is reduced.
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